U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

POLLUTION REPORT

DATE: 09/14/89

Region II Response and Prevention Branch Edison, New Jersey 08837

201-548-8730 - Commercial & FTS 24-Hour Emergency

POLREP NO.: One(1) and Final INCIDENT/SITE NO.: 1396/89

POLLUTANT: 3-Acetanilidoallylidenemalononitrile

CLASSIFICATION: Minor Potential Medium

SOURCE: Eastman Kodak Co. LOCATION: Rochester, N.Y. AMOUNT: Eleven Drums

WATER BODY: N/A

TO: B.Muszynski,EPA
S.Luftig, EPA
R.Salkie, EPA
B.Sprague,EPA

B.Sprague, EPA M.O'Toole, NYSDEC P.Bush, NYSDEC-VIII

ERD OS-210

NRC LEPC

Data Base Manager A.Rodriguez,EPA J.Cosentino,EPA W.Mugdan,EPA

1. SITUATION:

A. At 1345 hrs. on September 7,1989 EPA-Response and Prevention Branch (RPB) received notification from the NYSDEC regarding a release involving a cyanide based chemical at the subject facility. The release initiated at or about 1000 hrs. NYSDEC informed RPB that the release formed a vapor cloud and that as a result local streets were closed and a limited evacuation of facility staff and a sheltering advice was promulgated by facility personnel and Monroe County Office of Emergency Management. Subsequent phone discussions between RPB and Kodak and also Monroe OEM revealed the situation was brought under control that evening at approximately 2200hrs.

2. ACTION TAKEN:

- A. EPA-OSCs performed a facility response on September 13 at 1100hrs. The purpose of this response was to obtain information on the cause of the release, problems associated with the overall response and to ascertain why Kodak failed to notify the NRC.
- B. Kodak's processing operation involves the development of 3-Acetanilidoally-lidenemalononitrile in a batching type operation. The final step of the development of this crystalline solid includes drying at a temperature not to exceed 120 c. Apparently, due to a problem with the steel jacketed dryers this temperature was exceeded. Due to the appearance of this batch

it was packaged into fiber drums and segregated from other materials on the floor with the anticipation of re-working it. Shortly thereafter, the batch approximately 2000 lbs., began to violently decompose on the floor of the building. A fine fog spray was utilized by firemen to keep an ensuing vapor cloud localized and to cool the containers after the drums were removed outside onto a concrete and macadam lot. Products of combustion according to its MSDS are CO2, CO and NOx. Air bag samples retrieved by company personnel during the incident and received on September 13, revealed the presence of aniline and acetonitrile and other organic compounds which the company indicated could have come from other sources.

- C. Facility response apparently was quick as well as the response from others. Also 30 people complained of eye and throat irritation. The facility personnel attribute this to a large congretation of outside responders who inhaled their own vehicle exhaust fumes while milling around at the command post.
- D. Facility personnel did not notify the NRC since they felt that a RQ was not met. However, the facility did not know the quantity of material released. OSC urged the facility to notify on all unpermitted releases that have the potential for meeting their RQs.

3. MEASURES WHICH COULD AVOID RELEASES OF SIMILAR NATURES:

A. Fail safe engineering on all processes. More specifically, high temperature alarms where critical temperatures have the potential to be exceeded.

FINAL POLREP X	FURTHER POLREPS FORTHCOMING	SUBMITTED BY (12.) Thormmon
		Charles E. Fitzsimmons, OSC
		Response and Prevention Branch
		DATE RELEASED 9-14-89